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CASE STUDIES OF NON-EU SPORT DIPLOMACY: UNITED 
KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, CHINA & QATAR
INTRODUCTION
The following section discusses the approach selected by non-European Union (EU) countries to 
sport diplomacy. Its purpose is to identify how states employ sport within broader public diplomacy 
approaches. This will highlight to the EU and its Member States good practices and associated 
risks. Five countries were selected, each with a different approach. The United Kingdom (UK) has 
a long tradition of attempting to shape international perceptions through sport and it stands as 
a useful European comparator. The United States (U.S.) is selected due to its long engagement 
with public diplomacy and being one of only a few states with a well-developed sport diplomacy 
strategy. Australia’s inclusion is justified as it is believed to be the first country to have created 
and adopted a formal sport diplomacy strategy. China and Qatar provide non-European and non-
democratic points of comparison. They are included to highlight the diplomatic use of sport from 
an Asian and Middle Eastern perspective and to demonstrate the approach of a super-power and a 
small state, albeit in Qatar’s case, a disproportionately influential and wealthy one. 
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1. CASE 1: THE UNITED KINGDOM, FROM RULE 
BRITANNIA TO COOL BRITANNIA                               
From the start of the twentieth century, the UK’s global power has been in relative decline. The 
humiliation of the 1956 Suez Crisis confirmed the trajectory and re-oriented UK foreign policy in a 
European direction with the first of its applications to the European Economic Community coming in 
1961. Despite this, the UK has maintained a strong image internationally. The Royal Family, the BBC 
news network, the British Council, globally prominent universities and iconic sporting events, such 
as Wimbledon, Royal Ascot and the FA Cup Final have contributed to the UK remaining culturally 
relevant in the world.1  
Some of this cultural relevance can be attributed to government departments/institutions/services. 
Two prominent public diplomacy services  are state funded – the BBC World Service and the British 
Council. Since 1932, the BBC World Service has been broadcasting multi-lingual radio programmes 
to the world “as a provider of news, information and entertainment, and as a tool of public 
diplomacy”.2  According to a House of Commons Select Committee, the World Service has made 
a “unique contribution to the United Kingdom’s public diplomacy as a world class international 
broadcaster”.3  Historically funded directly from the Foreign Office, it now derives the majority of its 
income from the BBC license fee scheme. Launched in 2000, the BBC Sport website forms a central 
part of the organisations news site, which in 2020 boasted a global readership of 438 million.4
Originally called the British Committee for Relations with Other Countries, the British Council was 
founded in 1934 with overseas offices opening four years later. At a time of financial depression 
and the rise of fascism, the UK government considered it necessary to establish a body that would 
promote in other countries “knowledge and understanding of the people of this country, of their 
philosophy and way of life, which will lead to a sympathetic appreciation of British foreign policy”.5 
In recent years, the British Council has recognised the value of sport diplomacy and it has worked 
in partnership with sports bodies to deliver significant projects across the world. For example, 
Premier Skills is a project run with the Football Association Premier League designed to empower 
grassroots coaches and referees to help young people through football. Using the global appeal of 
the Premier League as a key attraction, the programme has delivered projects in 29 countries since 
its establishment in 2007. 6 Similarly, Try Rugby is a partnership with Premiership Rugby in which 
British coaches deliver development activities in schools and communities in Brazil.7  
1 Maguire, J. (2011), Power and Global Sport: Zones of Prestige, Emulation and Resistance, Sport in Society, 14(7/8), p.1023.
2 Gillespie, M. & Webb, A. (2012), Diasporas and Diplomacy: Cosmopolitan Contact Zones at the BBC World Service (1932-2012), 
Taylor and Francis, p.2.
3 House of Commons (2006), Public Diplomacy, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Third Report of Session 2005-06, p.8. Accessed 
at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmfaff/903/903.pdf
4 ‘BBC News reaching highest ever global audience’, BBC News Website, 23/07/20, accessed at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-53517025 




The British Council’s Gulf Sport and Culture Programme, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
and Development Office, helps governments in the Gulf to invest in the creative, cultural and sports
sectors with the aim of promoting “a deeper understanding of positive core values underpinning UK 
sport”. 8 International Inspiration was London 2012’s sports legacy programme9. In addition to its UK 
focussed activities, this sport for development programme targeted policymakers, practitioners and  
children in 20 countries worldwide to inspire broader participation in sport. The programme ended in 
2014 and was positively reviewed for impact.10  
While the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (previously the FCO) has long deployed 
soft power through its public diplomacy, its “embrace of sport as an element in its soft power 
repertoire is both recent and tentative”. 11  The 2002 Wilton review of public diplomacy identified 
a lack of co-ordination in the UK’s approach to public diplomacy and recommended the adoption 
of “an overarching public diplomacy strategy”. 12  Soon after, and on the initiative of the Foreign 
Secretary, a second public diplomacy review was carried out by Lord Carter of Coles. Unlike Wilton, 
the Carter review acknowledged the role sport could play in UK public diplomacy. It stated, “it is 
possible that sport remains an area of untapped potential… and the use of sport in public diplomacy 
should continue to be explored”.13  
The staging of mega-events has offered the UK an opportunity to tap the potential of sport 
diplomacy, particularly as a source of nation branding. Although the 2002 Commonwealth Games 
held in Manchester can be regarded as one of the first UK major events which “can be analysed 
through its image building significance”,14  it is the London 2012 Olympic Games that stands 
out as an overt act of UK sport diplomacy. Through the ‘London 2012 Legacy Promises’, the UK 
government committed, amongst other things, to “make the UK a world-class sports nation” and 
“demonstrate that the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, to visit and for 
business”.15  The Department for Culture, Media and Sport added, that staging the Olympics will 
“allow millions of new, international visitors to enjoy the UK’s culture and heritage” and it “will 
generate new business opportunities and boost the UK’s inward investment and export capacity”.16  
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) stated that “London 2012 will have a profound impact 
on the UK’s international reputation”.17  
Whether the impact was ‘profound’ is a matter for debate, although Horne and Houlihan reported 
that in 2013, the UK was ranked third in the Nation Brand Index, an improvement from fourth in 
200918 and that a survey of international newspapers conducted by Grix and Houlihan in 2013 
indicated very positive perceptions of the image of Britain, particularly projected by the opening 
8 https://www.britishcouncil.org/gulf-sport-and-culture-programme
9 https://www.britishcouncil.org/society/sport/current-programmes/international-inspiration
10 Ecorys (2014), Final Evaluation of the International Inspiration Programme, accessed at:  https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/
default/files/ecorys_international_inspiration_final_review_2014_1.pdf
11 Grix, J. & Houlihan, B. (2013), Sports Mega-Events as Part of a Nation’s Soft Power Strategy: The Cases of Germany (2006) and the 
UK (2012), The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16(4), 584.
12 House of Commons (2006), Public Diplomacy, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Third Report of Session 2005-06, p.13. 
Accessed at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmfaff/903/903.pdf
13 The Carter Report, 2005, quoted in Grix, J. & Houlihan, B. (2013), Sports Mega-Events as Part of a Nation’s Soft Power Strategy: 
The Cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012), The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16(4), 584.
14 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.128.
15 Department for Culture, Media and Sport (2007), Our Promise for 2012: How the UK Will Benefit from the Olympic and Paralympic 
Games, accessed at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/77720/
DCMSLeafletAdobev5andlaterTPL.pdf
16 Ibid.
17 Quoted in Horne, J. & Houlihan, B. (2014), London 2012, in Grix, J. (ed), Leveraging Legacies from Sports Mega-Events: Concepts 
and Cases, Palgrave Macmillan, p.113.
18 Ibid.
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ceremony and by the organisation and delivery of the Games themselves.19 By 2013, it was  
estimated that the staging of the Games boosted the UK economy by £9.9 billion and by 2021, the 
UK had staged 25 major sporting events using 2012 infrastructure providing additional revenues.20  
Closely associated with the staging of mega-events is the question of the performance of UK 
athletes at such events. The dismal performance by British athletes at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics 
was considered an “embarrassment”.21 This partly reflected the “non-interventionist” sports model 
operating in the UK which saw the government take an arms-length approach to sports policy.22  
The prevailing attitude at the time was that it was not the place of government to run sport. By the 
end of the Thatcher regime in 1990, however, that attitude began to change as the state recognised 
the public interest in sport and realised that sport could be employed to deliver wider public policy 
goals. In November 1994, the state National Lottery was launched and public investment into sport 
increased significantly through the so-called ‘good causes’ distribution mechanism, one of which 
was sport. Despite this, it was only since London was awarded the Olympic Games in 2005 that the 
government turned its attention to using sporting performance to promote the British brand.   
Within government, sport policy falls within the remit of the Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS). It assumes primary responsibility for distributing National Lottery and 
government funds to sport, which it does through a devolved model involving UK Sport and the 
four Home Country Sport Councils from England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. These 
bodies are responsible for giving effect to overall government sport policy within their respective 
jurisdictions. In addition to its role as lead government agency for the attraction of major sporting 
events, UK Sport’s mission is to develop world class athletes capable of achieving high-level results 
at major sporting events. To achieve this, UK Sport has distributed hundreds of millions of pounds 
to national governing bodies and individual athletes that are earmarked for success.23 Success 
is largely measured by medals won and results of this investment have been impressive. Having 
finished 36th in the Atlanta Olympic medal table in 1996, Great Britain finished 2nd in the Olympic 
and Paralympic medal table at Rio in 2016, even eclipsing China.24   
The level of investment into elite sport has not been without criticism. Each medal won at the Rio 
Olympics “cost” approximately £4.1million.25 Critics argue that whilst the status of the UK on the 
international stage has been enhanced, little else has been achieved. For example, participation in 
sport in the UK has not been significantly increased,26 some sports have had funding withdrawn 
due to the focus on medal attainment27, and a win-at-all costs mentality has damaged athlete 
wellbeing.28  
19 Grix, J. & Houlihan, B. (2013), Sports Mega-Events as Part of a Nation’s Soft Power Strategy: The Cases of Germany (2006) and the 
UK (2012), The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16(4), 572-596.
20 Lewis, A. & Taylor, J. (2021), Sport: Law and Practice, Bloomsbury Professional, p.106.
21 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.130.
22 Chappelet, J.L. (2010), Autonomy of Sport in Europe, Council of Europe, p.19-20.
23 For example, £352 million is earmarked for the run up to Tokyo 2021 through to Paris 2024. See: UK Sport (2020), UK Sport 
outlines plans for £352million investment in Olympic and Paralympic sport (18/12/20), accessed at: https://www.uksport.gov.uk/
news/2020/12/18/paris-cycle-investment
24 https://www.uksport.gov.uk/about-us
25 ‘How many millions each Olympic medal has really cost Britain’, The Independent, 21/08/16. Accessed at: https://www.
independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/rio-2016-great-britain-secures-second-olympic-medal-table-sporting-superpower-tokyo-
2020-a7202761.html
26 ‘Olympic legacy: Did £1bn after 2012 get any more people doing sport?, BBC Online, 17/08/17, accessed at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-england-40817063 See also Weed, M. et al (2015), The Olympic Games and raising sport participation: a systematic review of 
evidence and an interrogation of policy for a demonstration effect, European Sport Management Quarterly, Vol 15 (2), 195-226.
27 For example, five sports initially had UK Sport funding withdrawn for Tokyo 2020, although some later received a reprieve.
28 ‘UK Sport denies win-at-any-cost Olympic mentality after testing revelations’, The Guardian, 13/07/2020, accessed at: https://www.
theguardian.com/sport/2020/jul/12/uk-sport-denies-win-at-any-cost-olympic-mentality-after-testing-revelations
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It should also be noted, and particularly since the introduction of the Devolution Acts of 1998, 
the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have begun to consider 
the diplomatic potential of sport.29 In 2019, the Scottish Government was advised to consider the 
potential of sport diplomacy to advance Scotland’s cultural relations, although it is yet to take its 
first significant steps.30 First out of the blocks is Wales. In 2020, the British Council published a 
report on how sport could play a role in its international engagement and diplomatic activities.31 The 
report made a series of recommendations for the Welsh Government and competent sports bodies 
to consider. In the report, the authors described Wales as “a small nation with a very large sporting 
footprint”.32 
29 The Devolution Acts, subsequently amended, are the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland 
Act 1998.




31 British Council (2020), Towards a Welsh Sports Diplomacy Strategy. Report commissioned by the British Council and written by Dr. 




2. CASE 2: THE UNITED STATES, SPORT DIPLOMACY 
– THE BEST KEPT SECRET OF U.S FOREIGN POLICY           
Since the end of World War 2 (WW2), the United States has been active in the field of public 
diplomacy. The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (known as the 
Smith-Mundt Act) sought to “promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, 
and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of 
the countries”.33 It did so through establishing a statutory information agency to disseminate abroad 
information about the U.S. and its people and an educational exchange service that facilitated 
reciprocal exchanges in the field of education, the arts and sciences. 
By 1953, President Eisenhower had established the United States Information Agency (USIA) as 
a tool to influence foreign publics and in 1956, he signed the International Cultural Exchange and 
Trade Fair Participation Act which provided for the promotion and strengthening of international 
relations through cultural and athletic exchanges and participation in international fairs and festivals. 
The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays 
Act, established the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) to oversee educational and 
cultural exchanges, including in the field of sport.  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Cold War preoccupied U.S. foreign policy, with image building 
being a prominent feature of 1960s U.S. sport diplomacy.34 Between 1954 and 1963 more than 60 
groups of athletes such as Jesse Owens and Althea Gibson, travelled to more than 100 countries 
on sport diplomacy missions.35 Other Cold War sport diplomacy initiatives included sending sports 
equipment and sports books to other countries, harnessing the appeal of celebrity athletes, such as 
the private basketball team the Harlem Globetrotters, and the staging of sports events, for example 
through the Global World Series, a series of baseball events.36 
During the 1970s, U.S. sport diplomacy had become synonymous with ‘ping-pong’ diplomacy, a 
reductive connection many scholars have since tried to dispel. Sino-American relations were poor 
since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, but the deteriorating nature of 
Sino-Soviet relations offered some prospect for U.S. China rapprochement and on entering the 
White House, President Nixon made China his “top priority”.37  Table tennis became the unlikely 
vehicle through which prospects of new relations were tested.
China agreed to participate in the table tennis world championships in Japan in 1971, having broken 
with its previous policy of not engaging with international organisations or events that included 
Taiwan, a country China retained a territorial claim over. At the tournament an impromptu meeting 
between Chinese world champion Zhuang Zedong and U.S. player Glenn Cowan resulted 
33 United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948, Sec 2
34 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.110.
35 Faulkner, O (2017), CultureConnect and the US Department of State: A Gateway to the Future of Sport Diplomacy in Esherick, C et al 
(eds) (2017), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, FiT Publishing, p.41.
36 Ibid, p.110.
37 Xu, G. (2008), Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895-2008, Chapter 5: The Sport of Ping-Pong Diplomacy, Harvard University 
Press, p.119.
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the U.S. team being invited to China to participate in two exhibition matches. The tour was a 
success and soon after, the U.S. lifted a trade embargo, currency controls and visa requirements on 
China.38 A matter of months later, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited China, paving the 
way for Nixon’s visit in early 1972. 
Many have reflected on the value of ping-pong diplomacy, and the balance sheet is largely positive. 
Ping-pong diplomacy “remarkably changed the political climate concerning Sino-American 
relations”39, it played a role in “transforming” these relations40, it “heralded in a new era in Sino-
American relations”41, and it paved “the way for peaceful conversations between two previously 
warring countries”.42 
The U.S. continued to practice sport diplomacy in the 1980s but just as ping-pong diplomacy came 
to define its approach in the 1970s, so the Olympic boycotts did likewise in the 1980s. The Carter 
administration boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion 
of Afghanistan43, a move reciprocated by the Soviet Union’s boycott of the Los Angeles Games of 
1984.44 In the run up to the L.A. Games, the President of the Games’ Organising Committee made 
a plea for the US to “catch up with the rest of the world”, through for example, adopting a more 
strategic approach to US sport diplomacy by using athletes and coaches and “envoys as emissaries 
of peace”.45 
 
By the 1990s, the Soviet Union had dissolved but the U.S. continued with ad hoc sport diplomacy 
initiatives, such as practicing wrestling and soccer diplomacy with Iran. Prior to the two national 
sides meeting in the 1998 FIFA World Cup in France, President Clinton stated that he hoped the 
game would be a “step toward ending the estrangement between our nations”.46 However, U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East, commencing with the Gulf War of 1991, tarnished the image of the 
U.S. in the 1990s in some strategically important regions, necessitating a rethink of US soft power. 
With the passage of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (1998), the US Information 
Agency was merged with the Department of State, and responsibility placed with the Under 
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy.47 However, just two years after the reforms came into 
effect, the US suffered the 9/11 attacks.
9/11 necessitated a rethink on U.S. soft power, akin to the reflection that took place after WW2. The 
U.S. State Department established CultureConnect. This exchange program sent cultural figures
38 Kobierecki, M. (2016), Ping-Pong Diplomacy and its Legacy in the American Foreign Policy, Polish Political Science Yearbook, 
Vol.43(1), p.310
39 Ibid, p.311.
40 Xu, G. (2008), Olympic Dreams: China and Sports 1895-2008, Chapter 5: The Sport of Ping-Pong Diplomacy, Harvard University 
Press, p.163.
41 Hong, F. & Zhouxiang, L. (2014), Politics First, Competition second: Sport and China’s Foreign Policy in the 1960s and 1970s, in 
Dichter, H. & Johns, A. (eds) (2014), Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft, and International Relations Since 1945, University Press of 
Kentucky, p.397-398.
42 Lecrom, C., & Ferry, M., (2017), The United States Government’s Role in Sport Diplomacy, in Esherick, C et al (eds) (2017), Case 
Studies in Sport Diplomacy, FiT Publishing, p.28.
43 Sarantakes, N. E. (2010), Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War, Cambridge University Press.
44 Kobierecki, M. (2015), Boycott of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games as an Example of Political Play-Acting of the Cold War 
Superpowers, Polish Political Science Yearbook, Vol.44, pp.93-111. See also, Tulli, U. (2018), “They Used American, All Painted and 
Polished, to Make the Enormous Impression They Did”: Selling the Reagan Revolution Through the 1984 Olympic Games, pp.223-242, in 
Rofe, S. (ed) Sport and Diplomacy: Games Within Games, Manchester University Press.
45 Peter Ueberroth, quoted in Faulkner, O (2017), CultureConnect and the US Department of State: A Gateway to the Future of Sport 
Diplomacy in Esherick, C et al (eds) (2017), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, FiT Publishing, p.41-42.
46 Chehabi, H.E. (2001), Sport Diplomacy Between the United States and Iran, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12:1., p.99.
47 US Department of State (1999), Reform and Restructuring of US Foreign Affairs Agencies: Public Diplomacy in the Department of 
State, Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, 30/09/99. Accessed 08/04/21 at: https://1997-2001.state.gov/
outreach/publicaffdip/fs_990930_merger.html 
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and sports stars abroad as Cultural Ambassadors and soon after the Cultural Envoys program 
employed lesser-known athletes. A particular focus was to use sport and the appeal of American 
culture to counter the negative image of the U.S. in strategically important regions, notably the 
Middle East. Ongoing overseas military interventions and reports of human rights abuses in U.S. 
military detention camps highlighted the limits of soft power when faced with ongoing expressions 
of hard power. Yet despite some scepticism within the State Department, soft power was not 
jettisoned48. 
Also a creature of 9/11 was SportsUnited, the U.S. sport diplomacy initiative with the task of 
reforging the image of the U.S. in estranged cultures and societies in Africa, the Middle East and 
Asia. Renamed the Sports Diplomacy Division in 2019, the Department is housed within the Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs which itself sits within the Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 
branch of the U.S. Department of State49. With an annual budget of over $5 million50 , Sports 
Diplomacy manages four programmes:51
Sports Visitors Program: Through this program, non-elite sports coaches, athletes and 
administrators from around the world are funded to visit the U.S. for a period of around two 
weeks. Activities are linked to U.S. sports and focus on issues including nutrition, strength and 
conditioning, gender equality, disability and team building. The purpose is to allow non-U.S. citizens 
to experience U.S. culture, society and values as a means developing cross-cultural understanding 
with participants “hopefully returning home with a more positive image of America”.52   
Sports Envoy Program: Whilst the Visitors Program facilitates inward exchanges, the Sports Envoy 
Program sends U.S. athletes and coaches to the world. The program works in partnership with the 
U.S. Olympic Committee, U.S. Sports federations and professional leagues with the U.S participants 
running programmes developed by U.S. embassies and consulates. 
Sports Grants Program: Within the International Sports Programming Initiative, U.S non-profit 
organisations receive grants to manage one-way and two-way exchange programmes for 
underserved youth athletes and/or coaches and administrators of youth sports. 
Global Sports Mentoring Program: Added in 2012 by Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, this program 
is the most recent addition with a focus on gender equality (the empowerment of girls and women) 
and disability rights. The program is based on a five-week mentorship scheme whereby twice 
annually, participants with leadership skills and experience in sport are selected by U.S. Embassies 
to visit the U.S.53  
In 2013 the U.S. Department of State published an evaluation of SportsUnited’s programs. It found, 
inter alia, that the vast majority of Sports Visitor and Sports Grants survey respondents reported that 
their views of the U.S. Government and the American people were more positive after participating 
in the program. In particular, over half of the respondents characterized their views of the American 
48 Faulkner, O (2017), CultureConnect and the US Department of State: A Gateway to the Future of Sport Diplomacy in Esherick, C et al 
(eds) (2017), Case Studies in Sport Diplomacy, FiT Publishing, p.40-43.
49 Note that, in common with many other countries, the U.S. favours the term ‘sports diplomacy’, whereas the EU institutions have thus 
far referred to the practice in the singular.
50 Lecrom, C., & Ferry, M., (2017), The United States Government’s Role in Sport Diplomacy, in Esherick, C et al (eds) (2017), Case 
Studies in Sport Diplomacy, FiT Publishing, p.22.
51 For further information consult the website of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA): https://eca.state.gov/about-bureau  
52 Murray, S. (2018), Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, p.100.
53 For a discussion see: McDonald, M. (2015), Imagining Neoliberal Feminisms? Thinking Critically About the US Diplomacy Campaign, 
‘Empowering Women and Girls Through Sports’, Sport in Society, 18(8), p.909-922.
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people as “much more favorable” after the program.54 Other findings reported included improved 
knowledge of American popular culture, sport, history, philanthropy, democratic values and 
political institutions. The Sports Envoys who were surveyed considered the programme “very 
effective” in creating goodwill and improved attitudes and beliefs about the American people55.  On 
returning home, the vast majority of foreign participants (98%) shared their experiences and/or new 
knowledge with others, especially friends and community members. The report concluded that the 
SportsUnited programs “had a profound impact on respondents”.56 Observing the programs, and 
considering their relatively low cost, Murray concluded that “the simplicity and power of sport to 
boost a nation’s diplomacy is self-evident”.57 
The programs run by the Sports Diplomacy Division fulfil Murray’s definition of ‘new’ sports 
diplomacy as they relate to the “[c]onscious, strategic and regular use of sport, sportspeople, 
sporting events and non-state sporting actors… in order to create collaborative, long-term and 
mutually beneficial partnerships”.58 But the U.S. government also practices “more specific, 
less institutionalized, or ad hoc bilateral sports exchanges”, such as basketball programmes.59 
Elsewhere, U.S. athletes have been known to act in a private capacity, with varying degrees of 
success. In 2012, tennis players, Venus and Serena Williams, staged exhibition matches in Nigeria 
and South Africa as part of the ‘Breaking the Mould’ programme. Less well received was former 
NBA player, Dennis Rodman’s 2013 visit to North Korea followed by his offer to “straighten things 
out” between President Trump and Kim Jong-un.60 
The staging of mega-events is a common feature of national sport diplomacy strategies due the 
global coverage and interest these events attract.61 The U.S. has staged a number of prominent 
mega-events “although they are rarely considered from the perspective of sports diplomacy” due to 
the limited steer from the state and the private profit motive that often underpinned such events.62  
This is not to say that the U.S. government does not recognise the benefits of such events for 
external image building, even if the external image being portrayed concerns the vibrancy of the 
private capitalist system rather than the state’s public sector image.63 The U.S. government has 
supported the staging of mega-events, even committing some federal funds to them, although such 
support generally falls short of a strong strategic commitment.64 It is yet to be seen whether the 
approach to the 2026 FIFA World Cup, co-hosted by the U.S., will alter this approach, or how the 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs intends to capitalise on the event. 
Elite level sporting success, such as topping medals tables at international tournaments, can 
also project a positive image of a country. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. State Department 
expressed concern about the declining performances of U.S. athletes vis-à-vis those from the 




57 Murray, S. (2018), Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, p.102.
58 Murray, S. (2018), Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, p.94.
59 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.112.
60 “Dennis Rodman offers to “straighten things out between Trump and Kim Jong-un”, Daily Intelligencer, 06/09/17.
61 The term ‘mega-event’ can probably only be employed to describe the Olympics and FIFA World Cup. ‘Major-events’ is term that 
captures second order tournaments such as the UEFA European Football Championships, the cricket and rugby World Cups and 
the Commonwealth Games. For discussion see: Grix, J. & Houlihan, B. (2013), Sports Mega-Events as Part of a Nation’s Soft Power 
Strategy: The Cases of Germany (2006) and the UK (2012), The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16(4), 573. 
62 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.115.
63 A theme developed by Umberto Tulli in: Tulli, U. (2018), “They Used American, All Painted and Polished, to Make the Enormous 
Impression They Did”: Selling the Reagan Revolution Through the 1984 Olympic Games, pp.222-242, in Rofe, S. (ed) Sport and 
Diplomacy: Games Within Games, Manchester University Press.
64 For example, according to Umberto Tulli, the U.S. government played an active role in the organisation of the 1984 Olympic Games. 
Ibid, p.224.
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Soviet Union in international sporting events.65 In response, the Ford administration established 
the 1975 Commission on Olympic Sports and later, President Carter marked the “politicization of 
American athletics” with the passage of the Amateur Sports Act 1978, which was overtly a “product 
of the Cold War”.66 The reforms were organisational and financial and even though this might be 
considered a specific Cold War intervention, it highlights the willingness of the U.S. government to 
take steps to protect its sporting image on the world stage. 
In recent years, the U.S. has performed well in medals tables and the focus on international image 
and prestige in international tournaments has become less of a federal concern, although the 
existence of the 1978 Act highlights the willingness of the state to act. The Act, first amended in 
1998, has recently been revisited in response to sexual abuse scandals in U.S. sport. In 2020, 
Congress enacted the Empowering Olympic, Paralympic and Amateur Athletes Act 2020, amending 
the 1978 Act. Whilst the Act does not seek to advance sport diplomacy objectives, it strengthens 
Congressional oversight over sports governance and a new Commission will explore, amongst other 
things, whether the U.S. is performing as expected in international tournaments.67 
In conclusion, the U.S. has a long tradition of practicing public diplomacy, with the strategic use of 
sport diplomacy being a prominent feature within it. Being home to many established and globally 
prominent sports, sport diplomacy has offered successive U.S. administrations a low cost and low 
risk means of achieving foreign policy objectives. Since 9/11, U.S. sport diplomacy has proven to be 
quite resilient. Whilst presidential changes have altered the focus of sport diplomacy priorities, the 
concept of sport diplomacy has been retained, even during the turbulent Trump administration.  The 
U.S. has also managed to evaluate the impact of its strategy thereby allowing it to build on good 
practice. The risks are generally low68, but the risks of using diplomatically untrained sportspersons 
appears to be outweighed by the advantages. Of bigger concern is the risk that gains from U.S. soft 
power are fragile when expressions of U.S. hard power damage its overseas image. The chaotic 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 highlights these risks but also the 
importance of diplomatic re-engagement at some point in the future.
 
65 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.117-118.
66 Hunt, T. (2007), Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympic Medals Race: The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 and American Athletics 
Policy Reform, The International Journal of the History of Sport, Vol.24(6), pp.797 & 809.
67 Conrad, M. (2021), The Covid-19 Pandemic, Empowering Olympic, Paralympic and Amateur Athletes Act, and the dawn of a New Age 
of U.S. Olympic Reform, Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport, Vol.31(1), p.30.
68 Although note the financial fallout from the NBA’s tweet in support of the Hong Kong protestors. See, ‘China NBA: How one tweet 
derailed the NBS’s China game plan’, BBC News, 10/10/19, accessed at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-49995985
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3. CASE 3: AUSTRALIA, ‘SPORTS’ DIPLOMACY PIONEERS 
Given that Australia is widely regarded as the epitome of a sporting nation, it is perhaps surprising 
that it took until 2012 for sport to feature strategically in the country’s public diplomacy.69 In that 
year, the government published a White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century which recognised 
the value of sport in building Australia’s regional policy and contributing to an improved international 
image and greater trade and tourism.  Since then, Australia has been at the forefront of a strategic 
approach to sport diplomacy.70 
According to Murray71 and Murray and Price,72 the path to a fully-fledged sport diplomacy strategy 
was itself strategically oriented. First, the case had to be made why sport fitted into the diplomatic 
toolkit and here the answer was obvious – if sport is so important to Australian society, why does 
it not feature in its diplomacy? Second, the diplomats themselves needed convincing. A series of 
workshops and information packs run and written by a team of diplomats and academics sought 
to convince “dinosaur” opinions within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).73 Third, 
a small group of individuals working in DFAT drove the process without engaging a turf war with 
other government departments. Fourth, DFAT established a working group to coordinate a ‘whole-
of-government’ approach and to engage other non-governmental actors. Fifth, discussion then 
took place on how sport diplomacy could relate to traditional foreign policy goals. Sixth, political 
support was sought, with the presence of a sports loving and receptive Prime Minister and Minister 
for Foreign Affairs greatly facilitating that task. Finally, the strategy was drawn up and launched by 
Prime Minister Abbott in 2015, a strategy believed to be the world’s first Sport Diplomacy Strategy.74 
It focussed on the Indo-Pacific region and was based on four key goals:75 
Connecting people and institutions: The approach sought to assist target countries 
build their sports systems by way of people-to-people connections through a sports 
exchange programme, a sports fellowship scheme and through a sports leaders mentoring 
programme. 
Enhancing sport for development: The strategy here was to enhance development and 
public diplomacy activities through sport for development programmes such as the Pacific 
Sports Partnerships and Sports Volunteers Australia programmes.
Showcasing Australia: A set of programmes falling under this goal sought to showcase 
Australian sporting capabilities, build bilateral relations and promote Australia. The Match 
Australia scheme was the government’s international sports business programme focussing 
on major events, coordinated by a Major Events Taskforce. The International Media Visits 
programme was designed to provide accurate international media reporting on Australia 
and the Sports Envoys programme employed high-profile sports people to promote 
Australia. 
69 Although, the hosting of the 2000 Sydney Olympics formed part of Australian sport diplomacy as did a Sports Outreach Program 
which started in the Pacific region in 2006. However, neither can be considered as constituting a ‘strategic’ approach.
70 Murray, S. (2018), Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, p.99.
71 Murray, S. (2017), Sports Diplomacy in the Australian Context: Theory into Practice, Politics & Policy, 10/2017 Vol. 45(4), 850-851.
72 British Council (2020), Towards a Welsh Sports Diplomacy Strategy. Report commissioned by the British Council and written by Dr. 
Stuart Murray and Mr. Gavin Price, p.14-15. Accessed at: https://wales.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/towards_a_welsh_sports_
diplomacy_strategy_0.pdf
73 Murray, S. (2018), Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice, Routledge, p.121.
74 Ibid, p.100.






Supporting innovation and integrity: Activities based around this goal were designed 
to sustain Australia’s sporting advantage by supporting innovative sports projects and 
partnerships between Australia and the Indo-Pacific region. The Sports Innovation Australia 
programme provide funding for collaborative projects. The Sports Memorandums of 
Understanding scheme was designed to establish bilateral governmental agreements and 
the Sports Integrity Program provided oversight, monitoring and co-ordination to advance 
and protect the integrity of sport in Australia with a particular focus on doping, match-fixing 
and corruption.
According to the Australian government, the 2015-18 strategy “achieved significant wins” 
including delivering two sports for development programmes in the Pacific and Asia, employing 
over 50 partnerships to enable 1.5 million to participate in sporting activities, reducing inequalities 
experienced by women, girls and those with disabilities and awarding ten sports fellowships.76  
Building on the 2015-18 strategy, in 2019 a second sport diplomacy strategy was launched – Sports 
Diplomacy 2030. The new strategy, which is designed to align with Australia’s first national sport 
plan (Sport 2030), retains the previous focus on the Indo-Pacific and is again built around four key 
priority areas with the first phase of the strategy running to 202277:  
Empower Australian sport to represent Australia globally: This aspect of the strategy 
recognises that sport can play a role in promoting ‘brand Australia’. The strategy seeks to 
promote Australian sports leaders’ knowledge, skills and connections to represent Australia 
on the global stage. It seeks to increase Australia’s representation on international sporting 
bodies and associations, and it attempts to develop tools to spread awareness of sport 
diplomacy across government and the sport industry.  
Build linkages with our neighbours: In order to boost Australia’s engagement with the 
Pacific, the government launched the Australia Pacific Sports Linkages Program, a people-
to-people programme that provides for athlete exchanges, opportunities for emerging 
pacific athletes to participate in high-performance training in Australia, and pathways 
opportunities for Pacific teams and athletes to participate in Australian and international 
sporting competitions.   
Maximise trade, tourism and investment opportunities: In recognition that sport diplomacy 
can boost a country’s economy, the Australian strategy seeks to showcase Australia’s 
expertise in the sports industry, promote Australia as a host for major sporting events, 
employ Australian sports to advance economic interests in the region and provide 
education to athletes and sports representatives so they can promote Australia, including 
through trade missions and targeted sport diplomacy initiatives.  
Strengthen communities in the Indo-Pacific: A sport for development focus was retained 
within the fourth pillar with the launch of the Australian Sports Partnerships Program. 
With an annual budget A$6 million, the programme will deliver sport for development 
programmes in the Pacific region and in doing so will facilitate attainment of the UN’s 
Agenda 2030 sustainable development goals.  
Progress on the Sports Diplomacy 2030 strategy is reviewed every four years with a range of 
indictors cited determine success. A Sports Diplomacy Advisory Council assists with the delivery 
and monitoring of the plan. 
76 Australian Government (2019), Sports Diplomacy 2030 Strategy, p. 7, accessed at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/sports-
diplomacy-2030.pdf








4. CASE 4: CHINA, THE COMING OUT PARTY                                 
Public diplomacy has long been employed by the Chinese government as a means of building 
influence, cultivating allies, and prompting its culture abroad. In doing so, China has attempted 
to counter concerns within the international community that it is a growing influence and threat in 
global affairs. Central to this strategy are the network of Confucius institutes that offer language and 
cultural programmes overseas. These institutes serve a similar role to those operating out of the 
UK (British Council) and Germany (Goethe-Institut), but they have attracted criticism in the West for 
being “propaganda tools”.78  
Sport diplomacy features heavily in Chinese public diplomacy. The ping-pong diplomacy of 1971, 
discussed above, is perhaps the best-known example of how sport was employed to thaw frozen  
estranged relations with the U.S., but more recently, the hosting of major sporting events has 
been used as a tool for projecting a positive image of China on the world stage. Initially adopting 
a regional strategy with the hosting of the Asian Games in 1990, China made an unsuccessful bid 
for the 2000 Olympics, finally securing the Games in 2008. The Beijing Games were designed to 
confront the negative perceptions of China and present an image of a modern, developed, wealthy 
and peaceful country who was taking its place in the orderly international community79, not as 
a capitalist equal to western powers, but as a powerful state that has emerged using a different 
form of political association.80 The 2008 Olympics were China’s “coming out party”81. As a nation-
branding exercise, the Games increased China’s reputation in areas in which it was already strong 
but it didn’t improve its reputation in areas in which it was negatively perceived.82 Some have 
suggested that China’s image actually declined following Beijing83, a view supported by those 
critical of China’s treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the clampdown on protestors in Hong Kong, and 
a perceived lack of transparency over the outbreak of Covid-19. In 2022, Beijing will host for the 
Winter Olympics. At the same time, the staging of mega-events serves domestic political objectives 
such as highlighting the success of the communist model to domestic audiences thus enhancing 
the legitimacy of the ruling elite.     
As with the UK, China has invested in elite-level sport as a means of attracting a positive image 
with external audiences. Elite sporting success serves to highlight the modernisation of China 
and display the success of its form of political association. In the Summer Olympic Games, China 
performs consistently highly in the medal table, achieving first place in 2008, second in 2012 and 
2020 and third in 2016. These achievements can be largely attributed to a reform of the elite sport 
system following a disappointing showing in the 1988 Seoul Olympics.84 In recent years, China has 
broadened its investment strategy to include the development of its domestic football league and 
the ambition for the men’s and women’s national football teams to climb the FIFA rankings. After 
some huge investments, particularly to attract high profile overseas players, spending on football in
78 BBC (2019), Confucius Institutes: The growth of China’s controversial cultural branch, 07/09/2019, accessed at https://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-asia-china-49511231
79 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.121.
80 Grix J., Brannagan P.M., Lee D. (2019) Entering the Global Arena. Mega Event Planning, Palgrave Pivot, Singapore, p.74.
81 Ibid, pp.69-82.
82 Panagiotopoulou, R. (2012), Nation Branding and the Olympic Games: New Media Images for Greece and China, The International 
Journal of the History of Sport, 29:16, 2341.
83 Manzenreiter, W. (2010) The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power, Journal of Sport and 
Social Issues, 34 (1), p.40.
84 Grix J., Brannagan P.M., Lee D. (2019) Entering the Global Arena. Mega Event Planning, Palgrave Pivot, Singapore, p.72.
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China has undergone significant retrenchment. Investments have also been made by private 
Chinese entrepreneurs into European football, as a means of currying favour with the Chinese 
leadership.85 This private dimension to public diplomacy reveals a form of self-coordination by 
private actors seeking to please the leadership. However, it is showing signs of stress. In recent 
years, the Chinese leadership has expressed concern at the levels of overseas spending and the 
self-coordinating forces have imposed retrenchment in this area as well.   
China’s use of sport exchanges “flourished” in the 1950s and 1960s and continued as a legacy of 
the 2008 Games.86 China has also been active in area of sports development with considerable 
investment being directed into the building of sports stadia overseas. Such investment, whilst 
fostering a positive image of China in the target countries, is also a means of breaking into new 
import and export markets. 
85 Ibid, p.77.
86 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.126.
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5. CASE 5: QATAR, SMALL STATES WITH LARGE 
FOOTPRINTS – RISKS AND REWARDS                                  
Qatar is joining a number of small states attempting to use sport as part of its diplomatic 
repertoire.87 The difference with many states of equivalent population size is that Qatar is a very 
wealthy nation and so possesses the financial means to do so.88 In recent years, sport has added 
a new dimension to Qatar’s public diplomacy which notably included the state’s establishment 
of the television broadcaster Al-Jazeera which allowed for the projection of a modern image of 
Qatar to both domestic and overseas audiences. Similarly, through the Qatar Investment Authority, 
the state has a resonance throughout the world with investments in notable overseas institutions 
including Harrods, Canary Wharf, Heathrow Airport, Volkswagen and Barclays. Cultivating a 
positive image abroad can help build alliances with overseas powers in case Qatar faces economic, 
political or military hostility from neighbouring states and it can help boost investment and tourism 
opportunities. 
Within its broader public diplomacy, sport plays an important role. Qatar has the financial means 
to use the hosting of major sporting events as a means of projecting an image of the Gulf-state 
distinct from its regional neighbours, some of which carrying negative perceptions amongst foreign 
audiences, including authoritarianism, terrorism and human rights abuses.89 Grix et al. highlight how, 
between 2004 and 2022, Qatar will have staged 24 major tournaments, including the hosting of the 
2022 FIFA World Cup.90 The 2022 tournament was also meant to strengthen Qatar’s environmental 
credentials with overseas audiences, particularly as a means of countering the view that Qatar 
acquired its wealth through damaging fossil fuel. The stadia are being cooled using low energy 
technology and the infrastructure can be dismantled and donated to developing countries following 
the conclusion of the tournament.
The strategy of using major events to project a modern image is not without risk.91 The acquisition 
of the hosting rights for the 2022 FIFA World Cup contributed to hostility from regional neighbours, 
led to accusations of corruption and it attracted criticism of Qatar’s human rights record, particularly 
in relation to the working conditions of the migrant workers who were building the World Cup 
infrastructure. The expectation that the staging of the World Cup would boost tourism has been 
damaged by reports of extreme heat, a lack of hotels, restrictions on alcohol consumption and 
hostility to the LGBTQ community. As discussed above, China also experienced this phenomenon 
of ‘soft-disempowerment and reputational risk’ following the staging of the Beijing games.92   
87 From a tiny population in 1971, the date of independence from the UK, the population of Qatar now stands at approximately 
2.8 million, the vast majority of whom are overseas nationals. Accessed at:  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.
TOTL?locations=QA
88 At its peak 2013, Qatar’s GDP per capita stood at $85,050 ($50,805 in 2020). By means of comparison, in 2020, the EU stood at 
$33,927. Accessed at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
89 Brannagan, P. M & Rookwood, J. (2016) Sports mega-events, soft power and soft disempowerment: international supporters’ 
perspectives on Qatar’s acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 8:2, p.174.
90 Grix J., Brannagan P.M., Lee D. (2019) Entering the Global Arena. Mega Event Planning, Palgrave Pivot, Singapore, p.100.
91 For a discussion see Brannagan, P. M & Rookwood, J. (2016) Sports mega-events, soft power and soft disempowerment: international 
supporters’ perspectives on Qatar’s acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals, International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 8:2.
92 Brannagan, P. M & Giulianotti, R (2015) Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar, global sport and football’s 2022 World Cup 
finals, Leisure Studies, 34:6, pp.703-719.
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Securing the 2022 FIFA World Cup was a major sporting and diplomatic achievement for a country 
the size of Qatar, yet to sustain reputational gains, Qatar also realises that it also needs to be known 
for its sporting excellence. This represents a major challenge for a country with only approximately 
300,000 nationals. Its Aspire Academy for Sports Excellence, managed by the Aspire Zone 
Foundation, is one means through talent is identified and developed and a means through which 
reliance on naturalisation schemes for overseas players to represent Qatar can be relied on less. 
Similar to China, Qatar also invested in domestic football with a number of high-profile European 
footballers being attracted to the national League. 
Qatar also invests in overseas sport. Qatari money has been used to sponsor major sporting 
events in Europe, including prominent equestrian events such as the Prix de l’Arc de Triomphe, the 
Glorious Goodwood Festival and Royal Ascot.93 Famously, in 2010, Barcelona ended its policy of 
not accepting paid sponsorships on shirts to enter an agreement with the Qatar Foundation, later 
replaced by Qatar Airways.94 French football club Paris St German was acquired by Qatar Sport 
Investment (QSI), a joint venture between the Ministry of Finance and Qatar’s National Olympic 
Committee.95 The club acquired a number of leading players, notably David Beckham, Zlatan 
Ibrahimovic, Neymar and most recently, Lionel Messi. The acquisition of Messi in 2021 “will ensure 
that Qatar’s projection of soft power continues, while the status, image and reputation of ‘brand 
Qatar’ are further burnished”.96 QSI also runs BeIN sports, a Qatari media group that has acquired 
the rights to multiple sporting events in countries across the world.  
93 Grix J., Brannagan P.M., Lee D. (2019) Entering the Global Arena. Mega Event Planning, Palgrave Pivot, Singapore, p.102-103.
94 The Guardian (2010), Barcelona agree €150m shirt sponsor deal Qatar Foundation, 10/12/10, accessed at: https://www.theguardian.
com/football/2010/dec/10/barcelona-shirt-sponsor-qatar-foundation
95 Kobierecki, M. (2020), Sports Diplomacy: Sports in the Diplomatic Activities of States and Non-State Actors, Lexington Books, p.147.
96 Chadwick, S. (2021) Lionel Messi: why his arrival in Paris is a key part of Qatar’s game plan, The Conversation, accessed at: https://
theconversation.com/lionel-messi-why-his-arrival-in-paris-is-a-key-part-of-qatars-game-plan-165982
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6. CONCLUSION                                
The above review highlights a number of themes as to why different types of  states employ sport as 
part of their diplomatic tool kits. Sport diplomacy  contributes to the projection of a positive image 
to external audiences. It can build better relations between states and enhance the internal and 
external legitimacy, brand and diplomacy of a state. This can result in security gains, the opening up 
of new markets and the expansion of tourism opportunities. Approaches to sport diplomacy vary but 
usually involve activities centred around the staging of major sporting events, investments into elite 
level sport and sport for development projects. Countries with formal strategies, such as the U.S. 
and Australia, place emphasis on people-to-people activities including the use of sport exchange 
programmes and sports envoys. Sport diplomacy strategies benefit from central government 
involvement, but it is evident that private actors, be they non-governmental organisations, university 
academics  or private entrepreneurs are also involved in sport diplomacy activities. Those states 
that have measured the impact of sport diplomacy activities report positive outcomes, but it is also 
observable that building strategies around the staging of major sporting events carries a number of 
risks, both internal and external. 
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